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Abstract 
 
International research has shown that schooling enhances within-groups wage dispersion. This 
assessment is typically based on private sector data and, up to date, the inequality implications 
of schooling have not been documented for the public sector. This paper uses recent data from 
eight European countries to explicitly take into account differences between the private and 
public sectors. Using quantile regression, the paper describes the effects of schooling on the 
location and shape of the conditional wage distribution in each sector. While the average impact 
of schooling on wages is similar across sectors, the impact of schooling on within-groups 
dispersion is found to be substantially larger in the private sector than in the public sector. This 
finding warns that the effects of the European educational expansion on overall within-groups 
dispersion may be lower than previously thought.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Most national governments consider educational expansion as an important policy tool when 
trying to reduce economic inequality. A more balanced distribution of education, it is argued, 
will result in a more balanced distribution of earnings. However, recent empirical research has 
shown that there exist a positive relation between education levels and wage dispersion within 
groups (Buchinsky, 1994, Hartog et al., 2001, Machado and Mata, 2005, Martins and Pereira, 
2004, Budría and Pereira, 2005). This finding raises serious concerns about the inequality-
reducing scope attributed to schooling, as it suggests that an educational expansion may raise 
overall wage inequality by enlarging wage differences within similarly educated individuals. 
Emerging evidence has shown, moreover, that most changes in wage inequality take place 
within groups, rather than between groups (Juhn et al., 1993, Katz and Autor, 1999, Gosling et 
al., 2000, Acemoglu, 2002, Tsakloglou and Cholezas, 2005, Lemieux, 2006). 
 
This paper intends to shed further light on the interplay between schooling and within-groups 
wage dispersion using recent data from eight European countries: Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. Up to date, the inequality implications of 
schooling have not been compared between the private and public sectors: while the impact of 
schooling on within-groups dispersion has been well documented for the private sector, 
evidence for the public sector is mostly lacking2. This paper takes a step towards filling this gap 
by asking: does the conditional wage distribution of education groups, and thus the impact of 
schooling on within-groups dispersion, differ across sectors?  
 
                                                          
2 Buchinsky (1994) pools together private and public servants and, therefore, does not differentiate between sectors.  
Hartog et al. (2001), Machado and Mata (2005), Martins and Pereira (2004), and Budría and Pereira (2005), in turn, 
restrict the analysis to private sector workers. 
The public sector has always attracted policy attention. The government is typically the largest 
employer in the economy and, as such, its wage settlements can exert a strong influence on 
those in the private sector. Despite recent efforts to increase both competition and efficiency of 
the public sector, most economies still see significant differences between the two sectors 
regarding the criteria adopted to select, recruit and promote workers, the adjustment of wage 
levels, the degree of regulation, and the role of collective bargaining and trade unions, thus 
resulting into a different distribution of earnings across sectors. As the public and the private 
sector compete on the labour market, differences in the wage structure may have important 
implications for the sorting of workers across sectors, the demand for certain types of 
qualifications, and the overall wage inequality. 
 
The existing literature on wage distributions in the public and private sectors is predominantly 
based on the public sector pay premium (Terrell, 1993, Hartog and Oosterbeck, 1993, Poterba 
and Rueben, 1994, Dustmann and Van Soest, 1997, 1998, Disney and Gosling, 1998, Mueller, 
1998, Tansel, 2005, Melly, 2005). The perspective of this paper is slightly different. Rather than 
calculating the wage differential between private and public sector workers for the total working 
population or for specific population groups, the paper examines wage differences within 
education groups in the private and the public sector. Unlike previous work, this paper does not 
attempt to examine the impact of public sector status on the conditional wage distribution. 
Rather, it describes and compares the effects of schooling on the conditional distribution of each 
sector. 
 
To that purpose, the paper exploits the following idea: schooling, rather than assuring a certain 
amount of earnings, gives access to a distribution of earnings. That distribution is characterized 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Quantile Regression (QR) methods. Estimation by 
OLS assumes that the marginal impact of schooling on wages is constant over the wage 
distribution. In this case, the effect of having one additional year of schooling can be 
represented by a shift (to the right) of the conditional wage distribution. Quantile returns, in 
turn, measure the wage effects of schooling at different points of the distribution, thus 
describing changes not only in the location but also in the shape of the distribution. By 
combining OLS with quantile regression, we can assess the impact of education on wage 
inequality between and within groups: while OLS returns measure the average differential 
between education groups, differences in quantile returns represent the wage differential 
between individuals that are in the same group but located at different quantiles.  
 
Buchinsky (1994) pioneered the use of quantile regression to describe the contribution of 
schooling to wage inequality3. In the same spirit, this paper, rather than providing explanations 
or testing any given theory of inequality, concentrates on distributional aspects. In doing so, it 
contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, it provides further evidence on the 
connection between schooling and within-groups dispersion. By comparing the conditional 
wage distribution across sectors, the paper contributes, at the same time, to the literature on the 
public-private sector differences regarding the structure of pay.  
 
Second, the paper provides updated evidence on the returns to schooling in Europe. Even 
though returns to schooling have been calculated for a large variety of countries and years, up to 
date there is little international comparable evidence4. Major differences between the studies 
arise not only from crucial differences in the model specifications but also from the use of 
different definitions of variables, diverging datasets and differently defined sample of 
                                                          
3 The quantile regression model was first introduced by Koenker and Basset (1978). For a survey of these models and 
some applications, see Buchinsky (1998), Fitzenberger et al. (2001), and Koenker and Hallock (2001). 
4 For international surveys, see Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994, 2004), Ashenfelter et al. (1999), Asplund and Pereira 
(1999), and Harmon et al. (2001). 
individuals. This paper contributes to fill this gap by using a common wage equation and 
comparable data from a set of European countries5.  
 
As a third contribution, the paper adds to the emerging literature on schooling and risk. 
Traditionally, researchers have ignored the heterogeneity of returns across individuals with the 
same observable characteristics. Carneiro et al. (2003) estimate that 40% of the US college 
graduates do not earn a positive return from their decision of completing higher education after 
high school. Harmon et al. (2003) find that after controlling for observable characteristics, 
almost 5% of men in the UK fail to earn a positive return from their educational investment. 
Maier et al. (2004) report that between 20% and 30% of German male workers earn a negative 
return from schooling, while more than 25% earn a return above 15%. This evidence suggests, 
in sum, that the educational investment is subject to a certain amount of wage risk. Pereira and 
Martins (2002) measure this risk by calculating differences in the returns to schooling across 
conditional quantiles. Such differences are residual inequalities of pay after controlling for 
observable characteristics and, thus, represent the unexplained (risky) part of earnings variation. 
This paper follows the same approach to inspect the amount of wage risk associated to the 
educational investment in the European private and public sectors. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the countries, datasets and 
variables used for the analysis. Overall wage inequality in Europe is described by reporting 
several measures of unconditional dispersion for the surveyed countries. Section III presents the 
quantile regression model. Section IV presents average and quantile estimates of the returns to 
schooling. Differences between sectors regarding the impact of schooling on wage dispersion 
                                                          
5 In the same vein, Trostel et al. (2002) and Martins and Pereira (2004) emphasize the use of a common equation to 
provide returns to schooling that are comparable across countries. 
 
are discussed. Section V outlines some hypothesis that may account for the observed patterns. 
Section VI presents the concluding remarks. The paper includes an Appendix that describes the 
national data sources and estimating samples.  
 
II.  Countries, datasets and variables 
 
We collect data on earnings and education for Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden and the UK. This was achieved under the framework of a research project, 
‘Education and Wage Inequality in Europe’ (EDWIN), where each country team analyzed their 
country datasets6. Appendix A describes such datasets, including the years for which the 
information applies, the number of observations used, and additional information concerning 
country-specific definitions of variables.  
 
We use the same estimation procedure and population group for all countries. We have 
restricted the sample to male wage earners, aged between 18 and 60, who work normally 
between 35 and 85 hours a week, and are not employed in the agricultural sector. Self-employed 
individuals, as well as those whose main activity status is paid apprenticeship, training, and 
unpaid family worker have been excluded from the sample. The case of women is disregarded 
on account of the extra complication of potential selectivity bias. Workers with a monthly wage 
rate that is less than 10% or over 10 times the average wage have also been excluded.  
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wages. Wages are measured before taxes in 
Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK, and after taxes in Italy and Portugal. 
                                                          
6 Due to contractual reasons, the national datasets could not be transferred across countries. For a description of the 
EDWIN project, visit http://www.etla.fi/edwin.  
Even though the aim of the paper is not to conduct a thorough comparison across countries, 
differences in the dependent variable should be taken into account when comparing the results.  
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for each country. The first column reports the proportion 
of the sample individuals working in each sector. Public servants account for 17.3% in Finland 
up to 26.7% in Norway. The next columns report the average number of schooling years and 
professional experience. Average schooling years are well above ten years, with the exception 
of Portugal, while experience levels are about 20 years in all countries. The last four columns 
report the ratios between wages at different deciles of the wage distribution and the Gini 
indexes. Wages at the 9th decile are between two and three times larger than wages at the 1st 
decile. The 9/5 ratio is higher than the 5/1 ratio in most cases, indicating that in Europe wage 
dispersion is relatively larger in the top part of the wage distribution. Relative to workers in the 
private sector, public sector servants are more educated, have more experience, and with the 
exception of Portugal and Sweden, show lower wage dispersion. 
 
---------- Insert Table 1 about here ------- 
 
III.  The model 
 
The quantile regression model can be written as 
 
where Xi is the vector of exogenous variables and βθ is the vector of parameters. Quantθ(ln wi| 
Xi) denotes the θth conditional quantile of ln w given X. The θth regression quantile, 0<θ <1, is 
defined as a solution to the problem 
(1)                                    with                    θiii θθi  θii β X) |X wln(QuanteβXwln =+=
 which, after defining the check function ρθ (z)=θz if z≥ 0 or ρθ (z)=(θ –1)z if z < 0, can be 
written as  
 
This problem is solved using linear programming methods. Standard errors for the vector of 
coefficients are obtainable by using the bootstrap method described in Buchinsky (1998). 
 
Our wage equation includes years of schooling, experience and experience squared, 
 
where θ = .1, .2, …, .9 is the quantile being analyzed. This parsimonious specification is a 
working compromise to have a common equation for all countries7. Using years of schooling 
rather than levels of education facilitates the comparison with previous works, as most other 
papers are based on the former variable.  
 
IV.  Empirical results 
 
In this section we calculate OLS returns to schooling as well as conditional returns at five 
representative quantiles: .10, .25, .50, .75, and .90. Henceforth, we will denote these quantiles 
by 10q, 25q, 50q, 75q and 90q.  
                                                          
7 Some typical variables in wage equations –such as tenure, occupation and part-time job– were not available in some 
of the national datasets. 
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Before presenting our results, it must be pointed out that some authors attempt to instrument 
sector choice using some observable characteristics that are related to the sector status but 
unrelated to wages. Workers might be heterogeneous across sectors with respect to some 
unmeasured characteristics in a non-random way, such as risk aversion, motivation, preferences 
for public sector work, etc., and self-select themselves according to those features. If this is the 
case and these characteristics are related to wages, then standard estimates of the returns to 
observable characteristics may be biased. However, there is no consisting evidence that 
controlling for selection yields more reliable estimates. In general, the validity of the 
instruments is questionable, as it is not clear whether the variables that explain sector choice are 
excludable from the wage equation. Probably due to differences in the quality of the 
instruments, the magnitude of selection effects is found to vary considerably across studies8. 
With this in mind and given the impossibility to find valid instruments that are common to the 
surveyed countries, this paper disregards selection effects9.  
 
A.  The private sector… 
 
The first set of results is presented in Table 2. As expected, education gives a substantial reward 
in the labour market. The average return to an additional year of schooling ranges from 5.67% 
in Italy to 8.98% in Finland, at an average of 7.13%. In all countries, the estimated return is 
significant at the 1% level. However, the impact of schooling on wages is not constant over the 
wage distribution. The schooling coefficient is higher at the upper parts of the distribution than 
at the lower parts, meaning that workers at high-pay jobs earn substantially higher returns from 
                                                          
8 See for example, Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993), Dustman and Van Soest (1998), Heitmueller (2004), Chen (2005), 
Tansel (2005), Hyder and Reilly, (2005), and Melly (2006). 
9 This is also the perspective in Dustmann and Van Soest (1997), Disney and Gosling (1998), Lucifora and Meurs 
(2004), and Melly (2005). 
 
schooling than workers at low-pay jobs. France and Portugal are two illustrative examples. In 
France an average return of 7.39% masks a return of only 4.10% in the first quantile and 9.77% 
in the top quantile. In Portugal, the average return is 7.31%. However, the returns at the bottom 
and the top of the distribution are, respectively, 5.17% and 8.10%.  
 
---------- Insert Table 2 about here ------- 
 
This upward profile has two clear implications. First, the conditional wage distribution of more 
educated workers is more dispersed than the conditional wage distribution of less educated 
workers. This has been called ‘the inequality increasing effect of education’ (Machado and 
Mata, 2005, p. 457): if we give more education to workers who have the same observable 
characteristics but are located at different quantiles of the wage distribution, then their wages 
will become more dispersed. We show that, without exception, this phenomenon is regular 
across European countries. It may be the case, therefore, that by raising the weight of the high-
spread group, an educational expansion in Europe increases overall wage inequality through the 
within- dimension.  
 
The second implication has to do with schooling as a risky investment. The unexplained 
component or earnings variation is frequently regarded in the literature as the amount of wage 
risk. Following Pereira and Martins (2002), this risk can be measured by the differences in the 
returns across quantiles, as such differences are residual inequalities of pay after controlling for 
the effect of skill differences by regression results. Our results show that to the extent that 
prospective students are not aware of the characteristics which will place them at some point of 
the wage distribution, the returns to their educational investment are largely unpredictable10.  
 
To provide a more illuminating view, in Table 3 we report several measures of wage inequality 
based on different parts of the distribution. As mentioned above, dispersion across quantiles is 
substantial. Thus, for example, the return differential between the 90q and the 10q quantiles 
ranges from 6.01 percentage points in Sweden to 1.88 percentage points in Finland. This means 
that, relative to workers at low-pay jobs (10q), workers at high-pay jobs (90q) earn from 
university education (approximately 15 years of schooling) an additional return of 90 percentage 
points in Sweden and 28 percentage points in Finland. This excess return represents the 
inequality increasing effect of education or, alternatively, the amount of wage risk associated to 
schooling.  
 
---------- Insert Table 3 about here ------- 
 
It must be pointed out that quantile estimates tend to be less precisely measured than ordinary 
estimates, particularly those at the extreme tails of the distribution (Buchinsky, 1998). It can be 
the case, therefore, that differences across quantiles, though substantial, turn out to be non-
significant. This would cast doubts on all statements concerning the impact of education on 
wage dispersion. In Table 3 we show that in most cases the estimated differentials are 
significant at the 1% confidence level. 
                                                          
10 Including additional controls in the wage equation does not change the estimated wage risk by much. Hartog et al. 
(2001) show that, even after controlling for a large set of observed individual and job characteristics, the variation of 
returns across quantiles is still large. Another argument is that the variation of returns across individuals may be 
partly due to individual heterogeneity unknown to the researcher (unobserved) but known to individuals and, as such, 
is not a true source of uncertainty. What is not in doubt, however, is that prospective students are uncertain about 
their future wages. Carneiro et al. (2003) show that most of the heterogeneity in the returns to college education 
cannot be forecasted by individuals at the time of making college choices. This uncertainty has recently attracted the 
attention of researchers, as it may have important consequences on individual earnings levels and earnings growth 
(Shaw, 1996, Bonin et al. 2006), the wage structure (Hartog and Vijverberg, 2002, Hartog et al., 2003) and the 
decision on extended schooling (Hartog and Serrano, 2002, Hogan and Walker, 2003). 
 
Using the information reported in Table 3, we can inspect to what extent the contribution to 
overall within-groups dispersion differs across segments of the wage distribution. Two patterns 
are apparent. First, in most countries, the 90q-10q differential more than doubles the 90q-50q 
differential. Thus, for example, in the UK and Portugal the 90q-10q spread is 6.1 and 4.6 times 
larger, respectively, than the 90q-50q spread. This indicates that conditional wage dispersion is 
higher at the bottom part of the wage distribution than at the upper part or, to put it different, 
that a significant amount of the wage dispersion within the educated arises from differences 
within individuals earning below-average returns. Italy and Norway, where dispersion is 
relatively larger at the top part of the wage distribution, are exceptions to the general pattern. 
Second, with the exception of Germany, in all countries the 75q-25q spread accounts for a large 
fraction of the 90q-10q spread. Excluding Germany, this fraction ranges from 52% in France up 
to 91% in Finland. According to this, a substantial amount of the total wage dispersion among 
the educated takes place in the middle part rather than in the tails of the wage distribution. 
 
All in all, the results show that in the European private sector more educated workers exhibit, 
conditional on observable characteristics, higher wage dispersion. Wage differences between 
educated workers that are located around and immediately below the median quantile contribute 
importantly to this pattern. In other words, the positive association between schooling and 
within-groups inequality is not due to a small fraction of educated individuals earning 
particularly low returns from education, but to substantial earnings differences within the total 
population of educated workers. Similarly, the results are at odds with the popular belief that 
differences among the high educated are mostly due to an elite of individuals earning 
remarkably high wages. 
 
 
B.  …and the public sector 
 
Next, we turn to the estimates for the public sector. As Table 4 shows, the average return to an 
additional year of schooling in the public sector ranges from 4.44% in Italy to 9.73% in Finland, 
and is statistically significant in all cases. Averaging across countries, the estimated return is 
6.40%, a value that is 0.73 percentage points lower than in the private sector. This result is in 
line with Psacharopoulos’ (1994) finding that, worldwide, returns to schooling are somewhat 
higher in the private sector than in the public sector.  
 
---------- Insert Table 4 about here ------- 
 
More interestingly, we find that the tendency of education to be more valued at high-pay jobs is 
much less apparent in the public sector than in the private sector. As Table 5 shows, only in one 
country, Italy, returns at the upper quantiles are significantly higher than at the lower quantiles 
regardless of the quantiles selected. In Finland, France and Sweden, differences across quantiles 
are significant only when certain parts of the distribution are considered. In the remaining 
countries, Germany, Norway, Portugal and the UK, the estimated returns are fairly uniform over 
the conditional wage distribution, indicating that differences in wage dispersion across 
education groups are small and non-significant.  
 
---------- Insert Table 5 about here ------- 
 
C.  Differences in wage dispersion and the shape of the conditional wage distributions 
 
As is apparent from the previous analysis, the association between schooling and within-groups 
dispersion is much sharper in the private sector than in the public sector. To provide a 
quantitative assessment on this issue, we average across countries and find that while in the 
private sector the 90q-10q, 90q-50q, 75q-25q, and 75q-50q spreads are, respectively, 3.38, 1.58, 
2.07 and 1.04, in the public sector these spreads fall to 1.50, 1.08, 0.58 and 0.54. Taking the 
90q-10q as a reference, we can conclude that in Europe the effect of schooling on within-groups 
dispersion is, on average, more than two times larger in the private sector than in the public 
sector. It must be noted that Italy is an exception to the general pattern, as in this country wage 
inequality within the educated is larger in the public sector than in the private sector. 
 
Next, we examine differences in the shape of the conditional distributions. To that purpose, 
Figure 1 plots the quantile-return profile in each sector. We detect two groups of countries. In 
France, Germany, Norway and Sweden the higher dispersion in the private sector is due to 
relatively large returns at the top part of the distribution. As opposite, in Finland, Portugal and 
the UK the higher dispersion within private sector workers is due to relatively low returns at the 
bottom part of the distribution.  
 
---------- Insert Figure 1 about here ------- 
 
Institutional differences across countries seem to indicate that “a glass ceiling effect” 
characterizes the public sector in the first group of countries, while in the second group the 
public sector is better described by a “high floor effect”. Poterba and Rueben (1994), Disney 
and Gosling (1998), Mueller (1998), Melly (2005) and Hyder and Reilly (2005) use quantile 
regression to analyze the wage effects of having a public sector job. They show that, by offering 
a higher floor for the low skilled (those located at the lower quantiles) and imposing a lower 
ceiling to the high skilled (those located at the upper quantiles), the public sector compresses 
wages. Our results offer a complementary and novel view: as far as education is concerned, the 
public sector compresses wages by offering to the high-skilled (upper quantiles) a lower return 
to education and a higher return to the low-skilled (lower quantiles). The extent of these two 
effects is found to differ across countries.  
 
V.  Discussion 
 
Even though testing hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper, we may advance some 
explanations that account for the lower dispersion in the public sector. Conditional on 
observable characteristics, those individuals that are located at higher quantiles of the earnings 
distribution have, presumably, more skills, where skills include ability, motivation, better 
academic credentials and other unobservable characteristics affecting productivity. The 
estimates show that while these favourable characteristics interact positively with schooling in 
the private sector, they are mostly innocuous in the public sector. A candidate explanation is 
that relative to the private sector, the public sector has a wider union presence and a more 
effective use of union power, less incentives relating wages to productivity, smaller monopsony 
and discrimination effects, and less flexibility in wage determination. Arguably, these factors 
conduct to a much flatter wage structure and, more specifically, to a more homogeneous reward 
to education.  
 
A complementary view is that unobserved skills may be more evenly spread within the public 
sector, thus resulting into smaller differences within groups. The State may have some interest 
to be perceived as a “good employer” and, consequently, end up offering (relatively) high wages 
to unskilled workers and (relatively) low wages to the high-skilled. Such mechanism would 
create incentives for the most skilled to move on to the private sector and for the less skilled to 
enter in the public sector. Given the limited access to public sector jobs, these effects would 
result into a homogenization of skills in the public sector rather than in the private sector. This 
view is consistent with the evidence reported in Borjas (2002), who shows that despite higher 
average wages, the US public sector finds it difficult to attract high-quality workforce due to 
lower earnings at the top part of the wage distribution. 
 
Explaining differences in the shape of the wage distributions is a more complex task. Even 
though some studies have compared the distribution of wages in European countries, there is 
still little evidence on the mechanisms that explain the observed differences, particularly those 
referring to the second and higher moments of the distributions11. Still, we can speculate that 
differences in labour market and educational institutions, the distribution of skills and 
educational qualifications, and the integration between schooling systems and labour markets 
translate into differences in the structure of pay and, more specifically, into asymmetries in the 
returns to education between sectors and across countries.  
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
According to the international evidence, schooling exerts a positive impact on within-groups 
wage dispersion. This finding raises serious concerns about the inequality-reducing scope that is 
commonly attributed to schooling, as it suggests that an educational expansion may raise overall 
wage inequality. Most studies, however, are based on private sector data and, up to date, the 
inequality implications of schooling among public servants are mostly unknown. This is 
                                                          
11 For a detailed comparison of the wage structure in several European countries, see Budría and Díaz-Giménez 
(2006). 
 
somewhat surprising, as more than one fifth of the European labour force works in public sector 
jobs.   
 
In this paper we asked: does the conditional wage distribution of education groups differ 
between the private and public sectors? To answer this question, we used recent comparable 
data from eight European countries. Drawing on quantile regression, we showed that in the 
private sector schooling has an effect on the location as well as on the shape of the conditional 
wage distribution: conditional on observable characteristics, educated workers display higher 
wages and higher wage dispersion. In the public sector, in turn, the effect of schooling is on the 
location rather than on the shape of the distribution: conditional on observable characteristics, 
educated workers display higher wages but not necessarily higher wage dispersion. This result 
warns that the positive association between education and within-groups wage inequality 
reported by previous work does not generally apply to the public sector. 
 
A limitation of our study is that, given the international coverage of the paper, we do not 
explore selection effects nor do we control for the endogeneity of schooling. These extensions 
are considered outside the scope of the present paper, which concentrates on distributional 
aspects.   
 
Our results have several implications. First, the allocation of qualified workers between the 
private and the public sector is important in shaping overall wage inequality. It has been 
documented that a large fraction of university graduates end up in public sector employment 
(Blank, 1985, Terrell, 1993, Disney and Gosling, 1998, Borjas, 2002). Given the lower 
dispersion in this sector, the effects of the European educational expansion on overall wage 
dispersion may be smaller than previously thought12. We think that it is high time that sector 
effects were explicitly taken into account when inspecting how changes in education groups and 
the market price of education have affected the European earnings distribution over the last 
years. 
 
Second, differences in the shape of the distributions may importantly affect the sorting of 
workers across sectors. Borjas (2002) shows that transitions between the public and private 
sectors are strongly influenced by the distribution of wages in each sector. In this paper we 
showed that high-skill individuals –further to the right of the conditional wage distribution– 
obtain larger returns from their educational investment. This effect is large in the private sector 
and small in the public sector. It is likely, therefore, that the European Union public sector finds 
it difficult to attract high-skill workers and to prevent high-skill workers from quitting and 
moving on to the private sector. Extending Borjas’s analysis to European countries would prove 
fruitful to evaluate the size of these filter effects.  
 
The third implication has to do with the demand for education. Bonin et al. (2006) find strong 
evidence that risk averse individuals have preferences for occupations with less dispersion. 
According to this, risk averse individuals may be inclined to choose education careers that are 
oriented towards public sector work. We showed, moreover, that the educational investment is 
subject to a certain degree of wage risk. Then, it may well be that a proportion of risk averse 
individuals decide not to pursue further education, due to the uncertainty associated to the 
educational investment. Hartog et al. (2002) explore the impact of parental educational 
background and income on the children’s attitude towards risk. They find that children whose 
                                                          
12 The educational update was intense during the nineties. In Europe, the proportion of individuals with less than 
upper secondary education fell from 45% in 1991 to 33% in 2001, while the proportion of individuals with upper 
secondary or tertiary education rose from 55% in 1991 to 77% in 2001 (OECD, 2004). 
parents are less educated or poorer exhibit more risk aversion. According to this, policies 
oriented to reduce the perceived risk and to promote schooling among risk averse individuals 
may have beneficial effects on efficiency and economic equality. At the same time, 
investigating the characteristics of those individuals earning lower returns will help in the task 
of promoting education among those who have fewer incentives to invest in education. 
 
 
Appendix A. Description of data sources and estimating samples 
 
Table 1A. National datasets 
Country Data source Year 
Final number of 
observations 
Wages 
Finland 
Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) 
2001 5,356 Gross 
France 
Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) 
2001 21,142 Gross 
Germany 
German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP) 
2000 1,895 Gross 
Italy 
Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth 
(SHIW) 
2000 2,116 Net 
Norway 
Level of Living Surveys 
(LLS) 
2000 974 Gross 
Portugal 
Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) 
2000 5,738 Net 
Sweden 
Level of Living Survey 
(LLS) 
2000 973 Gross 
UK 
Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) 
2003 14,642 Gross 
 
Finland. The Labour Force Survey is a representative sample of the whole Finnish population. The 
sample has traditionally contained some 9,000 individuals aged 15-64 as stratified according to age, sex 
and region. Apart from these specific individual characteristics, also the information on education and 
income is register based. The rest of the information is self-reported through questionnaires and 
interviews undertaken by Statistics Finland. The LFS has the advantage of comprising a rich set of 
background characteristics concerning the individual and his/her job. A less satisfactory feature of the 
data is that it lacks the panel property, i.e. the survey sample varies from year to year. The LFS was 
previously conducted biannually, but from 1995 onwards it has been undertaken on an annual basis.  
France. The French results are based on the Labour Force Survey (so-called in France "Enquête 
Emploi"). It is a household survey conducted each year by INSEE the French statistics institute. Each data 
set has information on some 150,000 individuals belonging to some 80,000 households. It is a rotating 
panel as only a third of the sample is renewed each year. It contains information on a variety of indicators 
related to family background, education, employment and occupational status, though the main focus is 
on employment history, current employment and job search. The survey also provides information on 
monthly wages and working hours for the employed, so that we can construct hourly wages. Wages are 
given before income tax, though net of social contributions.  
Germany. The data is taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The GSOEP is a longitudinal 
household survey conducted on an annual basis since 1984. In the first wave, some 12,000 individuals 
aged 16 and over, and distributed across roughly 6,000 households, were interviewed. The information 
available is drawn from the statements of the individuals. Individual and household identifiers make it 
possible to track individuals over time. Due to panel attrition, sample size reduces somewhat each year, 
but in 1998, a refreshment sample of about 2,000 persons was added to the data base. Initially, the sample 
only referred to residents in West Germany, but following German unification, the sample was extended 
to the former German Democratic Republic in 1990. The GSOEP is representative of the population 
residing in Germany and contains a large number of socio-economic variables on demography, education, 
employment, income, housing and health. For the data request, only West Germany was retained. 
Italy. The data comes from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth. This survey is conducted every 
two years since 1987 by the Bank of Italy. It is based on a random sample of approximately 8,000 
households. It contains data on households and individuals aged between 14 and 65, including highest 
completed school degree, age, work experience, gender, net yearly earnings, average weekly hours of 
work, and family economic background.   
Norway. The results are based on the Level of Living Surveys. This dataset has a panel structure in which 
about 5,000 individuals are interviewed in each wave. Individuals are wage earners, aged between 16 and 
67. They are asked to report the usual level of wages and hours, as well as their level of education.  
Portugal. We use the Portuguese Labour Force Survey. The PLFS is a quarterly survey of a 
representative sample of households in Portugal. Its sample size is about 45,000 individuals, and it has a 
rotating structure in which 1/5 of the sample is dropped randomly in each quarter. However, individuals 
can not be tracked over time. The IE asks individuals about their monthly net wage, age, education level, 
time when the first contract was obtained, sector of employment, type of contract, professional activity, 
hours worked, tenure, and region, among other variables, including information regarding past training 
activities.   
Sweden. The data is drawn from the 2000 wave of the Swedish Level of Living Survey, conducted by the 
Swedish Institute for Social Research. This dataset is a probability sample of approximately 6,000 
individuals (1/1000 of the Swedish adult population) and contains information on years of schooling, 
highest education level, work experience, seniority, gross monthly wages and gross and net hourly wages, 
sector of employment and occupation status.  
UK. The data set used to carry out the analysis is the Labour Force Survey. It is a survey of households 
living at private addresses in Great Britain. It is conducted by the Social Survey Division (SSD) of the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) and by the Department of Finance and Personnel in Northern Ireland. 
The survey covers 60,000 households and over 150,000 individuals every quarter.  
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Tables 
 
      Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
Private sector 
     Wage Ratios  
 Share Schooling Experience  9/1 9/5 5/1 Gini 
Finland  82.7 12.07 18.04  2.85 1.58 1.80 .284 
France  80.5 12.62 21.39  2.78 1.90 1.46 .261 
Germany  81.9 13.29 21.14  2.85 1.79 1.59 .255 
Italy  81.4 11.05 20.65  2.50 1.73 1.44 .225 
Norway  73.3 12.44 19.09  2.16 1.59 1.35 .202 
Portugal  79.1 6.80 21.40  2.88 1.95 1.48 .237 
Sweden  75.2 12.30 18.16  1.90 1.52 1.25 .156 
UK  79.1 12.91 17.95  3.52 1.94 1.81 .271 
Public sector 
     Wage Ratios  
 Share Schooling Experience  9/1 9/5 5/1 Gini 
Finland  17.3 13.11 21.50  2.63 1.70 1.55 .242 
France  19.5 13.52 23.24  2.57 1.73 1.48 .227 
Germany  18.1 14.48 20.00  2.34 1.59 1.47 .192 
Italy  18.6 12.29 25.39  2.27 1.67 1.36 .198 
Norway  26.7 14.08 20.42  1.72 1.34 1.28 .140 
Portugal  20.9 8.22 24.00  3.38 2.08 1.62 .279 
Sweden  24.8 13.88 22.53  2.11 1.60 1.32 .159 
UK  20.9 14.04 21.97  3.17 1.71 1.85 .242 
 
 
 
       Table 2. Average and quantile returns to schooling – Private sector 
 OLS 10q 25q 50q 75q 90q 
8.98*** 7.95*** 7.95*** 8.85*** 9.66*** 9.83*** Finland 
(.33) (.74) (.41) (.22) (.33) (.52) 
       
7.39*** 4.10*** 5.78*** 7.30*** 8.72*** 9.77*** France 
(.11) (.16) (.14) (.10) (.14) (.18) 
       
7.04*** 4.66*** 6.24*** 6.53*** 7.25*** 7.87*** Germany 
(.33) (.82) (.51) (.34) (.27) (.46) 
       
5.67*** 5.01*** 4.45*** 4.80*** 5.74*** 6.99*** Italy 
(.25) (.51) (.38) (.28) (.33) (.38) 
       
7.95*** 6.24*** 6.30*** 7.04*** 8.59*** 9.29*** Norway 
(.50) (.79) (.63) (.40) (.71) (1.19) 
       
7.31*** 5.17*** 5.92*** 7.46*** 8.00*** 8.10*** Portugal 
(.14) (.23) (.24) (.19) (.15) (.19) 
       
6.08*** 2.19*** 3.89*** 5.79*** 7.53*** 8.20*** Sweden 
(.42) (.83) (.64) (.41) (.61) (.87) 
       
6.58*** 4.89*** 5.85*** 6.84*** 7.45*** 7.22*** UK 
(.13) (.25) (.22) (.16) (.17) (.18) 
 
      
 
Note: i) * signals significant at the 10% level, ** signals significant at the 5% level, and *** signals 
significant at the 1% level; ii) standard errors in parenthesis; iii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-
robust. 
 
 
       Table 3. Within-groups wage inequality – Private sector 
 90q-10q  90q-50q  75q-25q  75q-50q 
        
Finland 1.88**  0.98*  1.71***  0.81** 
        
France 5.67***  2.47***  2.94***  1.42*** 
        
Germany 3.21***  1.34***  1.01***  0.72** 
        
Italy 1.98***  2.19***  1.29***  0.94*** 
        
Norway 3.05**  2.25***  2.29***  1.55*** 
        
Portugal 2.93***  0.64*  2.08***  0.54** 
        
Sweden 6.01***  2.41***  3.64***  1.74*** 
        
UK 2.33***  0.38*  1.60***  0.61** 
        
 
Note: i) * signals significant at the 10% level, ** signals significant at the 5% 
level, and *** signals significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Average and quantile returns to schooling – Public sector 
 OLS 10q 25q 50q 75q 90q 
9.73*** 9.35*** 9.42*** 8.52*** 9.63*** 10.09*** Finland 
(.45) (.74) (.59) (.38) (.46) (.76) 
       
5.88*** 4.37*** 5.25*** 5.10*** 5.44*** 7.18*** France 
(.15) (.25) (.16) (.16) (.14) (.25) 
       
5.80*** 4.83*** 5.39*** 5.62*** 5.54*** 5.93*** Germany 
(.45) (.81) (.40) (.36) (.43) (1.06) 
       
4.44*** 3.04*** 3.13*** 2.79*** 4.67*** 5.53*** Italy 
(.49) (1.10) (.51) (.57) (.65) (.88) 
       
4.91*** 4.95*** 4.17*** 4.13*** 4.15*** 4.53*** Norway 
(.45) (.78) (.31) (.29) (.32) (1.01) 
       
8.25*** 7.37*** 8.46*** 8.38*** 8.19*** 8.48*** Portugal 
(.24) (.64) (.38) (.31) (.28) (.57) 
       
5.06*** 2.40*** 3.04*** 4.84*** 5.95*** 6.22*** Sweden 
(.51) (.54) (.46) (.62) (.82) (1.36) 
       
7.09*** 6.75*** 7.25*** 7.03*** 7.15*** 7.06*** UK 
(.23) (.67) (.31) (.23) (.26) (.38) 
 
      
 
Note: i) * signals significant at the 10% level, ** signals significant at the 5% level, and *** signals 
significant at the 1% level; ii) standard errors in parenthesis; iii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-
robust. 
 
 
        Table 5. Within-groups wage inequality – Public sector 
 90q-10q  90q-50q  75q-25q  75q-50q 
        
Finland 0.74  1.57**  0.21  1.11*** 
        
France 2.81***  2.08***  0.19  0.34 
        
Germany 1.10  0.31  0.15  -0.08 
        
Italy 2.49**  2.74***  1.54**  1.88*** 
        
Norway -0.42  0.40  -0.02  0.02 
        
Portugal 1.11  0.10  -0.27  -0.19 
        
Sweden 3.82***  1.38**  2.91***  1.11 
        
UK 0.31  0.03  -0.10  0.12 
        
 
Note: i) * signals significant at the 10% level, ** signals significant at the 5% level, 
and *** signals significant at the 1% level. 
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   Figure 1. Returns to schooling at the selected quantiles 
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